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Abstract. In this paper, we study the security of the Micali-Schnorr
pseudorandom number generator. The security of this cryptographic
scheme is based on two computational problems which are variants of
the RSA problem. The RSA problem essentially aims at recovering the
plaintext from a random ciphertext. In the analysis of the Micali-Schnorr
pseudorandom generator, we are interested in instances of this problem
where the plaintext is small and where the ciphertext is not entirely
known. We will describe time / memory tradeoff techniques to solve
these hard problems which provides the first analysis of this pseudoran-
dom generator 25 years after its publication.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study two cryptographic computational problems related to the
RSA problem. Given a modulus N , product of two large prime numbers, and
an odd exponent e, coprime to ϕ(N) the order of the multiplicative group Z∗N ,
the RSA problem consists in recovering the plaintext m ∈ Z∗N from a random
ciphertext c = me mod N . The variants we look at consider particular instances
of this problem where the plaintext is small or where the plaintext is small and
only a part of the ciphertext is known. These two problems appear to be related
to the security of a pseudorandom generator proposed by Micali and Schnorr [21].
A pseudorandom generator is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that
expands short seeds (made of truly random bits) into longer bit sequences, whose
distribution cannot be distinguished from uniformly random bits by a compu-
tationally bounded algorithm. Pseudorandom number generators are probably
the most basic cryptographic primitive: they are widely used for block ciphers,
public-key encryption, digital signatures, keystream generation and as passwords
sources. It is well-known that pseudorandom generators exist if and only if one-
way functions exist [17] (though this generic construction is highly inefficient).
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The first practical generator with proven security was proposed by Blum and
Micali [6]. The Blum-Micali generator outputs only one bit per iteration – which
costs one exponentiation modulo a large prime p – and its security is based on
the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in Z∗p. It has been shown
(e.g. [18]) that the generator remains secure if one outputs O(log log p) bits per
iteration. Another line of pseudorandom generators is based on factoring-like as-
sumptions (e.g. [5, 21, 24]). The BBS generator was introduced by Blum, Blum
and Shub in [5] and proven secure under the assumption that deciding quadratic
residuosity modulo a composite Blum1 integer N is hard. The generator works
by repeatedly squaring modulo N a random seed in Z∗N and outputs (at each
iteration) the least significant bit of the current value. Similarly, the RSA gen-
erator works by iterating the RSA encryption mapping v 7→ ve mod N (for a
public RSA modulus N and a public exponent e coprime to ϕ(N)) on a secret
random initial seed value v0 ∈ Z
∗
N to compute the intermediate state values
vi+1 = v
e
i mod N (for i ∈ N) and outputting the least significant bit of the
state value at each iteration. In [1] Alexi et al. showed that one can output up to
O(log logN) bits per iteration of the BBS generator and the RSA generator. The
actual number of bits that can be output depends on the concrete parameters
adopted but the generators are considered too slow for most applications.
Another line of number-theoretic pseudorandom generators sacrifices prov-
able security for efficiency. Gennaro [15] suggested a discrete-logarithm based
generator that outputs O(log p) bits per modular exponentiation in Z∗p but its
security is based on a strong and not so well-studied “discrete logarithm with
short exponents” assumption. Steinfeld, Pieprzyk and Wang [24] showed, that
assuming the hardness of a strong variant of the RSA inversion problem modulo
the integer N , one can securely output as much as (1/2− 1/e) logN bits in the
RSA generator. On the other hand, Herrmann and May [20] showed heuristically
(using Coppersmith methods [10, 11]) that an output of (1−1/e) logN most sig-
nificant bits per iteration allows for efficient recovery of the whole sequence.
Micali and Schnorr [21] proposed a variant of the RSA generator that on
a secret random initial seed value x0 ∈ Z
∗
N computes the intermediate values
vi = x
e
i mod N and outputs, for some k ∈ N, the k least significant bits of vi. But
the successor xi+1 of xi is formed from a separate part of vi, the remaining most
significant bits (contrary to the incestuous RSA generator where xi+1 = vi).
The security of Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom generator relies on the (strong)
assumption that the distribution of xe mod N for random k-bit integers is indis-
tinguishable from the uniform distribution on Z∗N . The generator is insecure if
(1−1/e) logN least significant bits are output per iteration but no better attack
was proposed since its proposal 25 years ago. It remains open to know what is
the maximum quantity of information that can be output per iteration allowing
the generator to be efficient but still secure against potential attackers.
Our Techniques As dynamic programming, time / memory tradeoffs is a well-
known technique to reduce the time complexity of a problem using memory.
1 N is a Blum integer if N = pq with p and q primes and p, q ≡ 3 mod 4
Shamir and Schroeppel in [23] have described such algorithms for specific NP-
complete problems such as knapsack problems. In cryptography, this technique
has been used many times to analyze the security of symmetric primitives such
as block ciphers or stream ciphers and some computational problems such as
the baby-step giant-step algorithm to compute discrete logarithms. Basically,
some computations can be done independently of other resources. For instance,
using the public key the adversary can precompute some values and store a
small fraction of these values in the oﬄine phase. Then, the adversary gets some
ciphertexts and his goal can be to recover the secret key.
In [19] Hellman described a technique to invert random looking functions.
This technique has been rigorously studied in [13] by Fiat and Naor to work
for any functions and rigorous lower bounds have been given in [3] by Barkan,
Biham and Shamir. Oeschlin in [22] described a variant of Hellman tradeoff, but
this variant has been show equivalent to Hellman tradeoff by Barkan et al. since
many heuristics can be applied to Hellman technique. Finally, Babbage [2] and
Golic [16], then Biryukov and Shamir [4] presented tradeoff for stream cipher
by using more or less data. This resource is a crucial parameter in cryptanalysis
and it is important to present attacks using as low data complexity as possible.
Our contributions. In this paper, we use time/memory/data tradeoff tech-
niques to propose algorithms for two computational problems related to the
security of the Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom generator. The algorithms are de-
composed into two phases: the preprocessing one where the attacker constructs
large hash tables using the structure of the focused cryptosystem, and the real-
time phase where it uses the data produced by the cryptosystem and the hash
tables to retrieve the secrets. The three tradeoffs algorithms we describe are
similar to the tradeoffs for stream ciphers. However, in order to construct such
algorithms, we need to specify the function f we used. For stream ciphers, the
main idea is to execute from a hidden state the generator in order to have at
least logS bits of output if the state is of size S. Here, we decide to truncate the
output value. It is a bit weird to define f in such a way since the iteration of
such functions is no more related to the iteration of the generator. However, the
only things we need is to cover the space in such a way that the inversion will be
possible. This choice of function f is suitable for Micali-Schnorr generator but
does not work for the BBS or the RSA generator. Moreover, in order to prove
that the many Hellman tables algorithm works (our third algorithm), we need
to prove that each table uses an independent function. We provide such claim
in the analysis of the third algorithm. Indeed, this independence assumption is
in fact the tricky part of the analysis and Hellman paper relies on heuristic in
order to provide lower bounds on the time complexity of his scheme. Using a
computational argument we prove that the considered functions are independent.
Our algorithms do not contradict the strong assumption used for the Micali-
Schnorr pseudorandom generator. They can be applied even though only a small
part of the generator is output at each iteration. Moreover, we will show that
once one value is recovered using the algorithms we describe for the first problem,
then we are also able to retrieve the seed by using another time/memory tradeoff.
Finally, even if our algorithms beating the bound remain exponential, we achieve
to decrease the constant and that can be very interesting in cryptography (for
example, in the case of the factorization).
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we present the first problem we look
at and basics about the Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom generator. We explain why
the problem is easy for some small parameters. In Section 3, we describe three
time/memory algorithms for solving the first problem using different tradeoffs.
In Section 4, we show other tradeoffs to recover the seed of the generator.
2 Micali-Schnorr Pseudorandom Generator
The Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom generator is defined by the recursive sequence
(vi = x
e
i−1 mod N) for i ≥ 1, with (e,N) the RSA public key, x0 ∈ [0, 2
r[ the
secret seed of size2 r and vi = 2
kxi+wi. At each iteration, this generator outputs
the k least significant bits of vi, denoted by wi. In addition, denoting n the size
of the modulus N , only xi of size r = n − k, unknown, is reused for the next
iteration. Since the generator outputs O(k/ log e) bits per multiplication, one
wants k to be as large as possible and e to be as small as possible.
This pseudorandom generator is proven secure under the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The distribution of xe mod N for random r-bit integers is indis-
tinguishable by all polynomial-time statistical tests from the uniform distribution
of elements of Z∗N .
Description of the problem. Let (e,N) the RSA public key with N of size n.
Using the equality vi = 2
kxi + wi where vi ∈ ZN , wi ∈ [0, 2
k) and xi ∈ [0, 2
r),
we consider the recurrence sequence
∀i ≥ 1, vi = x
e
i−1 mod N (1)
Given (e,N, r), {w1, · · · , wj} with j ∈ N, the problem consists in retrieving one
value xc with c ∈ {0, · · · , j − 1}.
For an attacker, finding one of the values xi using some iterations of the
Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom generator will lead to infer its next outputs. The
difficulty of the above problem depends highly on the value of r. Figure 1 sums
up this hardness, with a transition value equal to n/e. We first explain why it is
easy to solve the problem when the size of r is less than n/e.
r
n/e
easy hard
polynomial-time exponential search
Fig. 1. Difficulty of the problem depending of the value r
2 Throughout the paper, the size of an integer is (an upper-bound of) its bit-size.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the value x0 of size r is odd. If r ≤ n/e, given (e,N)
and w1, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which retrieves the value x0.
Proof. If r ≤ n/e, the modular reduction is not performed in Equation 1, so
v1 = x
e
0 over the integers and using v1 = 2
kx1 + w1, one has the following
modular equation:
xe0 = w1 mod 2
k
where all the values except x0 are known. We now use the well-known Hensel’s
lifting lemma to retrieve this secret value.
Lemma 1 (Hensel’s lifting lemma). Let p be a prime and c be a positive
integer. One denotes f a polynomial having a root x modulo pc which satisfies:
f(x) = 0 mod pc and f ′(x) 6= 0 mod p
Then, one can lift x to obtain an unique nontrivial root x∗ ∈ [0, pc+1) verifying:
f(x∗) = 0 mod pc+1 and x∗ = x mod pc
With Lemma 1, by using f(x) = xe − w1, one can reconstruct bit per bit
x0 looking at the powers of 2. The value x
∗ can be efficiently computed by
x∗ = x+ λ · 2c where λ = − f(x)2c · (f
′(x))−1 mod 2. ⊓⊔
Note that if the value x0 is even, one loses the uniqueness of the lift. However,
computing xe −w1 mod 2
k for each candidate x of size r can suffice to retrieve
this value; else one tests another output wi of the generator.
Another possibility to retrieve the seed consists in raising w1 to the power
e−1 mod 2k−1 (notice that e is odd). However the complexity of Hensel lift-
ing is linear in the size of the root, contrary to this exponentiation.
To avoid this simple algorithm but to remain efficient, i.e to output a maximum
of bits per iteration, the parameter k has to be smaller than ⌊n(1− 1e )⌋. Finally,
it seems hard to find a polynomial-time algorithm if r > n/e, for example by
using Coppersmith techniques, which are techniques bases on lattice reduction
to find small modular roots.
3 Solving the Problem using Time/Memory/Data
Tradeoffs
For now, we consider the problem in the case where r is larger than n/e and we
will present three similar algorithms that use different tradeoffs in order to solve
the problem. These algorithms use the fact that only the hidden information, i.e
the value xi of a relatively small size r, is recycled for the next iteration contrary
to some other pseudorandom generators as the BBS or the RSA ones. We denote
the five key parameters as follows:
– 2r represents the cardinality of the search space.
– P represents the time required by the preprocessing phase of the algorithm.
– M represents the quantity of access memory required for the algorithm.
– T represents the time required by the online phase of the algorithm.
– D represents the quantity of data required for the algorithm.
3.1 First algorithm
The first algorithm is quite simple to explain and to implement but not really
efficient. The preprocessing phase consists in storing the couples (x, LSBk(x
e
mod N)) for some different values of x in a hash table. During the online phase,
one tests for each value wi if it appears in the hash table. For example, it will
work by taking M = 2r/3 and D = T = 22r/3 or even M = T = D = 2r/2. The
proof is given in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 2. Given (e,N) and D consecutive values w1, · · · , wD, there exists
an algorithm which retrieves one of the values x0, · · · , xD−1 in time T , by using
M random access memory such that TM = O(2r) with D = O(T ).
3.2 Second algorithm using one Hellman’s table
The two next algorithms are based on [19, 4]. Hellman then Biryukov and Shamir
have proposed different attacks using tradeoffs for breaking block ciphers and
stream ciphers. We define a special function in order to apply these attacks for
solving our problem, and thus for the Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom generator.
This second algorithm gives the same tradeoff as the first one, but need less
data: for M = 2r/3 and T = 22r/3, it just requires a bit more than 2r/3 data.
Theorem 3. Given (e,N) and D consecutive values w1, · · · , wD, there exists
an algorithm which retrieves one of the values x0, · · · , xD−1 in time T , by using
M random access memory such that TM = O(2r) with T ≤ D2.
Proof. Algorithm. Let f be the function defined by f(x) = LSBr(x
e mod N)
where LSBr(x) represents the r least significant bits of x. The preprocessing
phase consists in computing for m random different values x10, · · · , x
m
0 the values
f t(x10), · · · , f
t(xm0 ) with m, t ∈ N and where f
t means that the function f is
iterated t times. The construction of a hash table containing the f t(xi0) as keys
and the xi0 as associated values, for i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, concludes this phase.
The algorithm in online phase works as follows:
1. One selects a known value wj for j > 0.
2. One considers only the r least significant bits of wj , denoted by zj .
3. For i ∈ {0, · · · , t}, one tests if f i(zj) is a key of the hash function. If the
t+ 1 tests fail, one selects the next known value and restarts the algorithm.
4. If a test succeeds, denoting the associated value xc0, one has:
f t−i(xc0) = zj = f(f
t−i−1(xc0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
)
X is a value of size r that corresponds with high probability to the hidden
part of the generator at the previous iteration. A simple verification consists
of the computation of the value Xe mod N .
Value Hellman’s Matrix for our algorithm Key
x1
0
f
−→ f(x10)
f
−→ · · ·
f
−→ f t−1(x10)
f
−→ f t(x1
0
)
...
...
xc
0
f
−→ · · ·
f
−→ X︸ ︷︷ ︸
step 4
f
−→ zj
f
−→ · · ·
f
−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
step 3
f i(zj)
...
...
xm
0
f
−→ f(xm0 )
f
−→ · · ·
f
−→ f t−1(xm0 )
f
−→ f t(xm
0
)
Table 1. Computation of our algorithm using a hash table
Table 1 gives an overview of the algorithm by manipulating the hash table and
using the function f .
Complexity. The number of different values in this table can be estimated as
follows (the end value of each chain is not counted):
E(#{f j(xi0), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ j < m}) =
m∑
i=1
t−1∑
j=0
Pr[Ai,j ]
where Ai,j the event [f
j(xi0) /∈ {f
j′(xi
′
0 ), i
′ < i or j′ < j}]. Note that Ai,j ⊆
Ai,j−1 (since f
j(xi0) = f
j−1(xi0)). Moreover, we have the following property:
Pr[Ai,j |Ai,j−1] ≥ 1−
it
2r
⇒ Pr[Ai,j ] ≥
(
1−
it
2r
)j+1
Hence, the probability p that the value we search is in the Hellman’s table is
greater than 2−r
∑m
i=1
∑t−1
j=0(1−
it
2r )
j+1.
By denoting D the number of known values of the recurrence, the time required
by the preprocessing phase of the algorithm P is equal to O(mt), the memory
M and the time of the algorithm T are defined by M = O(m) and T = O(Dt).
For each known value of the recurrence, one has a probability p depending on
the size of the table to success, and thus we need Dp = O(1). If mt2 ≪ 2r then
p ≈ 2−rmt. Consequently we obtain the tradeoff Dt ·m = O(2r), i.e TM = 2r
with T ≤ D2 (due to mt2 ≪ 2r).
As the table gets larger, some chains will eventually collide and merge due to the
birthday paradox. So it may be preferable to use many small tables, that is the
next attack. Finally note that, at step 4, each value f i(zj) may have multiple
predecessors, hence there is a small probability that f t−i(xc0) will not be equal
to zj . In this case, one tries an other output but it is clear that these “false
alarms” will increase the complexity by only a small constant factor. ⊓⊔
3.3 Third algorithm using many Hellman tables
This last algorithm which uses more tables, proposes then another repartition be-
tween the memory, the time and the data. For example, for M = 25r/8, T = 2r/2
and D = 2r/8, this tradeoff is preferable compared to the first two algorithms.
This set of tables covers a larger fraction of the possible output values and
consequently, the online phase need less data. Each table requires a specific
function and, in order to cover different independent output values, the functions
need to be independent. In [19], Hellman rigorously calculated a lower bound on
the expected coverage of images by a single table which is essentially the same
analysis we did in the previous algorithm. However, the analysis for the full
scheme (with many tables) is highly heuristic and is based on the unjustifiable
assumption that many simple variants of f are independent of each other. Fiat
and Naor in [13] propose to use k-wise independent functions in order to propose
an algorithm to invert any function, while Hellman assumes that the function is
random. In order to replace the heuristic, one could think of using independent
functions for each table by computing gi = hi ◦ f , where {hi}i is a family of
k-wise independent functions. The main drawback is that the number of such
functions we need is exponential and it is not easy to construct such functions.
Here, we want to avoid Hellman heuristic while similar heuristic could be made.
For instance, we could define many functions by considering any r bits among
the n−r output bits which will give us
(
n−r
r
)
different functions. However, many
functions will have the same subset of bits and we cannot assume independence
between them. The analysis of the algorithm is based on the following hypothesis:
Assumption 2 Denoting f(x) = LSBr(x
e mod N), the distribution of f(x)
for random r′′-bit integers (r′′ ≥ r) x is indistinguishable by all polynomial-time
statistical tests from the uniform distribution of integers in [0, 2r).
Theorem 4. Given (e,N) and D consecutive values w1, · · · , wD, there exists
an algorithm which retrieves one of the values x0, · · · , xD−1 in time T , by using
M random access memory such that TM2D2 = O(22r) with D2 ≤ T ≤ 2r.
Proof. Algorithm. The third algorithm is similar to the second one but, instead
of using a single table, one uses ℓ = t/D hash tables of size mt (assuming that
t > D). First, one has to find which table covers the output value. Then one
applies the second algorithm. Consequently, the search of the table requires to
look for each value in all tables in parallel.
Complexity. Using the same analysis as for the second algorithm, we know
that we cover a fraction mt/2r of the output values with one table. Now, using
ℓ tables, we want to prove that the number of output values we cover is mtℓ. To
prove such result, we have to solve the independence problem, namely that to
describe independent functions for each table so that we are still able to invert f .
First of all, the whole output of the n− r least significant bits of xe mod N can
be used. But this only allows us to construct a constant number of functions. Our
second idea is to use the fact that f is a random function or that its outputs
are indistinguishable from the uniform distribution (Assumption 2). By using
ℓ random and independent values zi ∈ [0, 2
r′), we can define ℓ functions as
gi(x) = f(x + zi · 2
r) for i ∈ {1, · · · , ℓ}. We claim that this set of functions is
independent, otherwise assumption 2 will be wrong for r′′ = r + r′.
Using the same notations as in the previous proof, the probability p that the
value we search is in one of the ℓ Hellman’s tables is greater than 1 −
(
1 −
2−r
∑m
i=1
∑t−1
j=0(1 −
it
2r )
j+1
)ℓ
and p ≈ 2−rmtℓ if mt2 ≪ 2r. We clearly have
M = O(mℓ), T = O(Dtℓ) and P = O(mtℓ). For ℓ = t/D, we obtain the tradeoff
TM2D2 = O(22r) with D2 ≤ T ≤ 2r. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. This tradeoff is less constraining than Hellman tradeoff: we only need
that one value is in one table and not that a particular value.
4 Inverting RSA for Small Plaintext Problem
By using one of the previous algorithms, one knows the value of a hidden part of
the generator denoted xi for i ≥ 0. We now present two different ways to invert
the Micali-Schnorr generator, i.e to retrieve the secret seed x0.
Description of the problem. Let (e,N) be an RSA public key with N of size
n and an integer r ≤ n. Given (N, e, r) and y = xe mod N for x ∈ [0, 2r), the
problem consists in recovering x.
Remark 2. This problem is well-known to be solvable in polynomial time when
r ≤ n/e since as before the equality holds over the integers.
4.1 Multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials
Let P (x) ∈ ZN [x] be a polynomial of degree less than n = 2
k. The multipoint
evaluation problem is the task of evaluating P at n distinct points α0, . . . , αn−1 ∈
ZN . Using Horner’s rule, it is easy to propose a solution that uses O(n
2) addition
and multiplication in ZN but it is well-known that one can propose an algorithm
with quasi-linear complexity O˜(n) operations in ZN using a divide-and-conquer
approach [8, 14].
Let P0 =
∏n/2−1
ℓ=0 (x − αℓ) and P1 =
∏n−1
ℓ=n/2(x − αℓ) and let us define R0 =
P mod P0 and R1 = P mod P1. We have R0(αi) = P (αi) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n/2−
1} and R1(αi) = P (αi) for all i ∈ {n/2, . . . , n− 1} and this gives immediately a
recursive algorithm (i.e. compute P0, P1, R0, R1 and reduce the problem to the
multipoint evaluation of R0 and R1 of degree n/2 = 2
k−1).
Let Ai(x) = (x−αi) for i ∈ {0, . . . , n−1} and Pi,j = Aj2iAj2i+1 . . . Aj2i+2i−1
for i ∈ {0, . . . , k} and 0 ≤ j < 2k−i. We have P0,j = Aj and Pi+1,j = Pi,2jPi,2j+1
so for i ∈ {0, . . . , k} we can compute recursively all polynomials Pi,j and 0 ≤ j <
2k−i in 2k−i−1O(M(2i)) = O(M(n)) operations in ZN where M(i) denotes the
arithmetic complexity to compute the product of two polynomials of degree i in
ZN [x]. Overall, the computation of all polynomials Pi,j requires O(M(n) log n)
operations in ZN using a tree.
The polynomials R0 and R1 can be computed using O(M(n)) operations in
ZN (using a Newton inversion), hence the complexity T (n) of the recursive algo-
rithm satisfies T (n) = 2T (n/2)+O(M(n)) and therefore T (n) = O(M(n) log n).
The multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials has found numerous
application in cryptanalysis (e.g. [12, 9]). In our case, it is clear that using this
technique will lead to retrieve the seed. For example, using the same notations
as in preliminaries, suppose that we know the value of vi and want to retrieve
the value of xi−1 of the generator. That can be done by multipoint evaluating
the polynomial of degree e(2r/2 + 1):
P (X) = (Xe − vi)((X + 1)
e − vi)((X + 2)
e − vi)...((X + 2
r/2)e − vi) mod N
on the points k · 2r/2 for k = 0, · · · , 2r/2 in order to find kc such that P (kc ·
2r/2) = 0 mod N . Then, one searches the value of xi−1 on the form kc · 2
r/2 + ℓ
for ℓ = 0, · · · , 2r/2. This technique requires O˜(e · 2r/2) operations in ZN . Its
complexity is linear in e but, as mentioned above, e is chosen as small as possible
in practice. Moreover, one has to store the first tree, i.e 2r/2 polynomials.
Remark 3. This algorithm can be applied to attack the RSA encryption system
when used to encrypt a short secret key of a symmetric cipher. Our algorithm is
slightly less efficient than the one in [7] but it always succeeds (whereas recovering
a 40-bit plaintext for instance is successful only with probability 0.39 in [7]).
4.2 Coppersmith’s method
Another technique is based on the well-known Coppersmith’s method for the case
of a modular univariate polynomial. In 1996, Coppersmith introduced lattice-
based techniques for finding small roots on univariate and bivariate polynomial
equations in polynomial time [11, 10]. Some recalls are done in the full version.
In our case, starting from the equation xei−1 = vi mod N , we can define the
following modular univariate polynomial f as f(x) = xe−vi mod N . The value
xi−1 represents a small modular root of this polynomial. However, our root of
size r is not enough small for this technique which requires the root to be less
than N1/e, i.e r < n/e (see [11]). To circumvent this problem, one can guess j
bits of x in order to have r− j < n/e and then apply Coppersmith’s method for
each guess. Instead of f , one uses the polynomial g of degree e:
g(x) = (λ+ x)e − vi mod N
with λ the guessed value of j bits. The truncated value of xi−1 denoted by x
tr
i−1
is a small modular root of g. Its degree being the same, the asymptotic condition
on the size of the root remains the same. The followng theorem, proved in the
full version, establishes the condition on the bound:
Theorem 5. Using the set of polynomials {xjgi|j ≤ e − 1 ∧ i ≤ p − 1} ∪ {gp}
with p ∈ N, Coppersmith’s method will return xtri−1 as long as x
tr
i−1 < N
δ with:
δ =
∑p
i=1(e− 1)(i− 1) + i∑ep
i=1 i
=
ep− e+ 2
e2p+ 2
Starting from a basis (b1, · · · , bw) of a lattice of Z
m, this technique works in
complexity O(w4m logB(w + logB)) with B = max1≤i≤w ‖bi‖, and we have to
store the lattice of size w + m. By denoting xtri−1 < N
1
e
·(1−ǫ) with 0 < ǫ < 1,
one can determine the minimal value for p in order to retrieve the root, i.e
p = e−1−ǫeǫ = O(1/ǫ). The number of polynomials w being equal to e(p−1)+1 =
O( eǫ ), those of monomials m being equal to ep + 1 = O(
e
ǫ ) and logB = n, this
technique will require O(2r−
n
e
·(1+ǫ)( e
6n
ǫ6 +
e5n2
ǫ5 )) in time and O(
e
ǫ )
2 in memory.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, for the first time, we have shown that, for all recommended
parameters, we are able to predict the Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom gener-
ator faster than by an exhaustive search by using time/memory tradeoff or
time/memory/data tradeoff attacks. These attacks are feasible only because of
the specificity of this generator that uses only a small number to iterate and
it remains a open problem to design a time/memory tradeoff algorithm able to
infer sequences produced by the BBS or the RSA generator (in the range of
parameters not covered by Herrmann and May techniques [20]).
We have also proposed three techniques (the last one is explained in the full
version) to reverse the generator and retrieve the generator seed. An interesting
open question is to decrease the memory requirement of our algorithms. The
ρ or λ methods for factoring and discrete logarithms (which were invented by
Pollard) use pseudorandom walks and require polynomial (or even constant)
memory rather than exponential as in our time/memory tradeoffs. They can
be applied to attack Gennaro’s efficient pseudorandom generator based on the
discrete logarithm [15] but it remains open to adapt this approach to predict the
Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom generator.
Acknowledgements. This work was supported in part by the French ANR-12-
JS02-0004 ROMAnTIC Project.
References
1. W. Alexi, B. Chor, O. Goldreich, and C.-P. Schnorr, RSA and Rabin functions:
Certain parts are as hard as the whole, SIAM J. Comput. 17 (1988), no. 2, 194–209.
2. S. Babbage, A space/time tradeoff in exhaustive search attacks on stream ciphers,
IEE Conference Publication - European Convention on Security and Detection,
vol. 408, 1995.
3. E. Barkan, E. Biham, and A. Shamir, Rigorous bounds on cryptanalytic
time/memory tradeoffs, Advances in Cryptology – Crypto 2006 (C. Dwork, ed.),
LNCS, vol. 4117, Springer, August 2006, pp. 1–21.
4. A. Biryukov and A. Shamir, Cryptanalytic time/memory/data tradeoffs for stream
ciphers, Advances in Cryptology – Asiacrypt 2000 (T. Okamoto, ed.), LNCS, vol.
1976, Springer, December 2000, pp. 1–13.
5. L. Blum, M. Blum, and M. Shub, A simple unpredictable pseudo-random number
generator, SIAM J. Comput. 15 (1986), no. 2, 364–383.
6. M. Blum and S. Micali, How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of
pseudo-random bits, SIAM J. Comput. 13 (1984), no. 4, 850–864.
7. D. Boneh, A. Joux, and P. Q. Nguyen,Why textbook ElGamal and RSA encryption
are insecure, Advances in Cryptology – Asiacrypt 2000 (T. Okamoto, ed.), LNCS,
vol. 1976, Springer, December 2000, pp. 30–43.
8. A. Bostan, P. Gaudry, and E´. Schost, Linear recurrences with polynomial coeffi-
cients and application to integer factorization and Cartier-Manin operator, SIAM
J. Comput. 36 (2007), no. 6, 1777–1806.
9. Y. Chen and P. Q. Nguyen, Faster algorithms for approximate common divisors:
Breaking fully-homomorphic-encryption challenges over the integers, Advances in
Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2012, LNCS, Springer, 2012, pp. 502–519.
10. D. Coppersmith, Finding a small root of a bivariate integer equation; factoring
with high bits known, Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt’96 (U. M. Maurer,
ed.), LNCS, vol. 1070, Springer, May 1996, pp. 178–189.
11. , Finding a small root of a univariate modular equation, Advances in Cryp-
tology – Eurocrypt’96 (U. M. Maurer, ed.), LNCS, vol. 1070, Springer, May 1996,
pp. 155–165.
12. J.-S. Coron, A. Joux, A. Mandal, D. Naccache, and M. Tibouchi, Cryptanaly-
sis of the RSA subgroup assumption from TCC 2005, PKC 2011: 14th Interna-
tional Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography(D. Cata-
lano, N. Fazio, R. Gennaro, and A. Nicolosi, eds.), LNCS, vol. 6571, Springer,
March 2011, pp. 147–155.
13. A. Fiat and M. Naor, Rigorous time/space trade-offs for inverting functions, SIAM
J. Comput. 29 (1999), no. 3, 790–803.
14. C. Fiduccia, Polynomial evaluation via the division algorithm: The Fast Fourier
Transform revisited, 4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (P. Fis-
cher, H. P. Zeiger, J. Ullman, and A. Rosenberg, eds.), ACM, 1972, pp. 88–93.
15. R. Gennaro, An improved pseudo-random generator based on the discrete logarithm
problem, Journal of Cryptology 18 (2005), no. 2, 91–110.
16. J. D. Golic, Cryptanalysis of alleged A5 stream cipher, Advances in Cryptology –
Eurocrypt’97 (W. Fumy, ed.), LNCS, vol. 1233, Springer, May 1997, pp. 239–255.
17. J. H˚astad, R. Impagliazzo, L. A. Levin, and M. Luby, A pseudorandom generator
from any one-way function, SIAM J. Comput. 28 (1999), no. 4, 1364–1396.
18. J. H˚astad and M. Na¨slund, The security of all RSA and discrete log bits, J. ACM
51 (2004), no. 2, 187–230.
19. M. E. Hellman, A cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off, IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Theory 26 (1980), no. 4, 401–406.
20. M. Herrmann and A. May, Attacking power generators using unravelled lineariza-
tion: When do we output too much?, Advances in Cryptology – Asiacrypt 2009
(M. Matsui, ed.), LNCS, vol. 5912, Springer, December 2009, pp. 487–504.
21. S. Micali and C.-P. Schnorr, Efficient, perfect polynomial random number genera-
tors, Journal of Cryptology 3 (1991), no. 3, 157–172.
22. P. Oechslin, Making a faster cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off, Advances in
Cryptology – Crypto 2003 (D. Boneh, ed.), LNCS, vol. 2729, Springer, August
2003, pp. 617–630.
23. R. Schroeppel and A. Shamir, A T = O(2n/2), S = O(2n/4) algorithm for certain
NP-complete problems, SIAM J. Comput. 10 (1981), no. 3, 456–464.
24. R. Steinfeld, J. Pieprzyk, and H. Wang, On the provable security of an efficient
RSA-based pseudorandom generator, Advances in Cryptology – Asiacrypt 2006
(X. Lai and K. Chen, eds.), LNCS, vol. 4284, Springer, December 2006, pp. 194–
209.
